Observations on the Administration of Parole by unknown
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The assumption underlying the institution of parole is that a period
of guidance and supervision for persons released from prison is useful
for helping offenders avoid further criminal activity. Experience has
shown, however, that persons once imprisoned will probably again
engage in criminal activity, and evaluation of the offender's conduct
immediately following release is necessary to determine whether a
further period of incarceration is appropriate. The parole system is
designed to fulfill the functions of both guidance and evaluation. On
the basis of three months of observing parole officers in Connecticut,'
this Note will examine how the structure of the correctional system,
and the assignment of multiple functions to parole officers, limit the
officers' ability to accomplish the goal of rehabilitatior.
I. The Conditions of Parole
Conditions of parole are imposed on every parolee.2 They purport to
regulate the parolee's behavior extensively, by prohibiting some activ-
ities and requiring him to obtain the permission of his officer for
others. As tools for control, conditions provide the trigger for initiating
revocation: while not all violations lead to revocation, parole is never
revoked unless some specific condition is violated. Critics within and
* The authors wish to thank Miss Eileen Hsu for suggesting the possibility of an
alternative to parole. We are also grateful to Mr. John Manson of the Connecticut De-
partment of Corrections, and the parole officers who let us observe them at work.
Because of the nature of the observation and the need to preserve confidentiality, manny
conclusions in this Note can be documented only by reference to the authors' experience.
1. The problems of observation in this setting are detailed in the otherwise unreadable
A. CICOUREL, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 1-18 (1968). In attempting to
examine the parole system as the parole officer sees it, we have adopted the techniques of
ethnomethodology, described in P. McHUGH, DEFINING TiE SITUATION (1968). Such all
approach sacrifices extensive data collection, but seeks to describe patterns of behavior
and to identify the sources of those patterns in structural features of the s)stein. Thl,
approach was selected for two reasons. First, very little sociological work of any nature
exists on the parole system. An excellent recent work, R. EMEPSON, JUDGINo DrLINQUrNIs
(1969), treats similar patterns in the system of juvenile probation, but the systems dilfer
significantly in the extent to which judges participate in the process and in the avail-
ability of alternative systems of social control. In addition, probation deals only with
offenders who have not served time in prison for their current offense, while all parolces
have been recently released from prison. Emerson's book does, however, shed light oil
specific problems in parole. Second, ethnomethodological studies of deviance have centered
on the life of the deviant rather than upon the instituitons which define the behavior as
deviant. For a review of the literature and a significant theoretical contribution, see D.
MATZA, BECOMING DELINQUENT (1969).
2. A printed form stating several general conditions is given to every parolee. Thle
Parole Board also imposes conditions tailored to certain classes of offenders, sucl as al.
coholics and narcotics addicts, and occasionally to individual offenders.
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outside the field of corrections have argued that conditions of parole
are often so broad as to be both meaningless and unenforceable.' Many
lawyers see such conditions as unbridled license for arbitrary action.
Conditions prohibiting association with "undesirable" characters may,
for example, be used to invoke sanctions against parolees whom more
political agencies wish to punish, such as a Mafia leader against whom
no evidence of crime can be found.4
Criticism of the breadth of parole conditions has ignored the im-
portance of these conditions in helping the parole officer fulfill his
guidance functions. More important to the officer than the use for
revocation is his use of conditions to gather information about the
parolee. Commentators, while recognizing that the officer has discre-
tion in defining violations,5 have failed to analyze this use of parole
conditions, focusing instead on the general problem of authority in
parole supervision. In practice, although conditions may not be a
means of building an effective casework relationship,0 they are never-
theless an important part of parole casework. But this use of the con-
ditions is made less effective by the existence of the threat that the
officer will use the information to initiate revocation.
In their initial conversations with newly-paroled men, officers com-
monly confront a problem: the parolees have learned about parole
through a prison communication system which obtains information
almost exclusively from prisoners whose parole has been revoked The
parolee's initial expectations, then, are often shaped by "horror stories"
about parole officers which have circulated in prison. A large part of
the initial interview must therefore be spent trying to dispel the
parolee's preconceptions-convincing him, for example, that a viola-
tion of his conditions, even an arrest for a misdemeanor, will not auto-
matically result in revocation of his parole. In reviewing the conditions,
3. See, e.g., R. DAWSON, SE-rENCING 306-07 (1969); Note, Judicial Review of Probation
Conditions, 67 COLUm. L. Rav. 181 (1967); Comment. Conditions of Probation Imposed
on Wisconsin Felons, 1962 Wis. L. REv. 672; Best & Birzon, Conditions of Probation: An
Analysis, 51 GaO. L.J. 809 (1963); VonHentig, Degrees of Parole Violation and Graded
Remedial Measures, 33 J. Cam. L. & C. 363, 365 (1943); Bates, On the Uses of Parole
Restrictions, 33 J. Cams. L. & C. 435 (1943). See also Note, Freedom and Rehabilitation
in Parole Revocation Proceedings, 72 YALE L.J. 368, 378 (1962).
4. The Eldridge Cleaver case is another illustration of howv political pressure can lead
to revocation of parole. In re Cleaver, 72 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1st Div. 1963); E. CL.-umn. POSr-
PRIsON WVRINGS AND SPEECHES (1969).
5. See Bates, supra note 3, at 438; DiCerbo, When Should Probation Be Revoled, 30
FE. PROB. 11, 12 (June 1966); Hendrick, Basic Conceptions of Conditions and Violations,
2 N.P.P.A.J. 1, 3 (1956).
6. See Wallace, The Casework Approach to Rules, 2 N.P.P.A.J. 14, 19 (1956).
7. Cf. Skolnick, Toward a Development Theory of Parole, 25 Am. Soc. Ray. 542. 543-44
(1960). Many offenders, of course, have learned of parole through prior experience-
which may have ended in revocation.
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the officer emphasizes not the pervasive control they authorize but the
minimal extent to which they will be used to restrain the parolee's
freedom of action."
At the same time, officers stress that the parolee must inform his
officer of any violations. The conditions provide that the officer must
be informed whenever the parolee contemplates an important change
in his life: a switch of residence, a new job, an impending marriage, an
intention to purchase a car. Failure to inform the officer never leads to
revocation, though it often elicits a reprimand. Officers use the con-
ditions not as tools to control the parolee's behavior, but as devices to
legitimize their inquiries into areas of the parolee's life which bear on
his rehabilitation. As such, conditions are a tool for casework. But
because of the parolee's ineradicable fear that violation may lead to a
return to prison, the parolee is never fully candid, He gives some in-
formation, retreats, hedges, and must be coaxed into telling a straight
story. The ofilcers, recognizing this reluctance, probe cautiously and
support the parolee, often by indicating that the officer's intercession
with other agencies will help the parolee.
To further a helping relationship with the parolee, the officer must
of course elicit information from him. The use of parole conditions to
compel disclosure of this information is not, however, necessary for
effective casework: once a parolee trusts the officer and sees him as an
advocate, information will flow willingly. Eliminating the fear that
information will be used as a basis for revocation will facilitate a rela.
tionship of trust, and a full and free flow of information will enable
the parole officer to be more effective in his guidance function.
II. The Parole Officer As Social Worker
The parole officer functions in much the same way as a social worker.
He is instrumental in channeling the parolee to specialized social
agencies such as psychiatric clinics and Halfway Houses. The officer
attempts to find every parolee an adequate job by developing contacts
and cultivating local businessmen. Routinely the officer intercedes with
the Motor Vehicles Bureau to restore the parolee's license. When
marital difficulties arise, the officer does some counseling, then guides
the parolee to a family service agency.
Like all social workers, the parole officer is limited by society's
8. Cf. W'allace, supra note 6, at 17-18.
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failure to provide resources adequate to deal with the client's prob-
lems. Many institutions which might help the parolee are overburdened
or ineffective. Moreover, some are hostile to narcotics addicts, a sig-
nificant proportion of the urban officer's caseload, because addicts are
believed not to benefit from the agencies' services." Similarly, the
officer may be limited by the lack of available jobs. Employers who do
hire parolees are frequently friendly and eager to help, but even they
cannot provide jobs in a depressed market. Within such limits, how-
ever, parole officers act as intermediaries between the parolee and
social institutions with which he has lost contact while in prison.
Though hindered by reliance on parole conditions in eliciting in-
formation about parolees' problems, and despite a lack of formal train-
ing for the task, parole officers attempt to counsel parolees on personal
problems which affect their success in readjusting to life outside prison.
This guidance is often superficial, but little blame can be attached to
the officer. Each parole officer sets aside one evening a week to receive
parolees on their required monthly visits. The information received by
the officer in these interviews is often pursued later in the week, when
he calls on other agencies with which the parolee has had contact. Dur-
ing much of his working day, the officer works closely with a limited
number of parolees whose problems put them in imminent danger of
returning to prison. But with a caseload of more than sixty,10 the officer
cannot spend much time in probing and inducing the parolee to dis-
close more than the parolee volunteers.
While direct counseling is somewhat limited by the time available,
it is even more constrained by the officer's doubts about the legitimacy
of his intervention. The officer believes that, since his "services" are
thrust upon the parolee, he cannot make his counsel too aggressive.
Guidance which appears to the parolee as control rather than advice is
regarded not only as an intrusion upon the parolee's privacy not
justified by consent, but as counterproductive in that it may bring out
a submerged fear of revocation. Counsel is therefore presented as gentle
suggestion which is often misunderstood by the parolee.
9. Parole officers and other social agencies accept -what Glazer calls "the myth that
two-thirds return," at least as it applies to narcotics addicts. See D. GLAzMr, Tie Errzc-
TIVENESS oF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSeMI ch. 1 (1964).
10. Caseloads in Connecticut average around 65 to 70. Effective supervision is said
to require caseloads of no more than 55. PRESmENT's Co MMSSIoN ON LAW .a'FEoMnrzmmr
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSrICE., TAsK FoRcE REPORT: CoRREcroNs 4. 70 (1967).
Compare R. Dawson, supra note S, at 332-33 (caseloads in Kansas 200, in Detroit 100, in
Milwaukee 55).
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III. Bureaucracy and Professionalism
The parole officer sees himself as a professional in social work and
corrections, but his job places him in a bureaucracy"1 whose need for
control often conflicts with the professional's desire for autonomy. In a
recent reorganization of the Connecticut corrections system, the parole
office was separated from the Board of Parole and placed within the
Department of Corrections. The Parole Board's responsibility ends,
barring a violation of parole, when parole is granted. The parole
officers are located in three field offices, each of which is headed by an
area supervisor. Besides his social work functions in guiding and being
consulted by the officers, the area supervisor coordinates the operation
of the field office and serves as its liaison to the Board of Parole and
the Department of Corrections. In each office there are several field
officers who work directly with parolees. Except for an institutional
parole officer who develops parole plans and orientation for prisoners
about to be released on parole, no other officer specializes in a par-
ticular type of offender; each officer is responsible for all parolees re-
leased to residences within a defined geographical area.12
The parole officer's claim to professionalism rests upon his kinship
to the social worker. Many definitions of "profession" have been ad-
vanced.13 Here it is enough to say that a professional is certified by an
agency other than the employer, and applies systematic knowledge
acquired through prescribed training. Though the knowledge involved
need not be scientific, it must be systematic. Legal doctrines, for ex-
ample, form a coherent body of knowledge which is not "scientific." In
addition, professionals adhere to norms defined by their own organiza-
tions; they see themselves as autonomous from their employers and
accountable only to their colleagues for validation of their professional
conduct. The most important professional norm is the service ideal:
professionals are obligated to supply help to all those in need of their
special expertise.
As a profession, social work involves knowledge of human motiva-
tion and social institutions, and the application of that knowledge to
the problems clients present. The professional norm of objectivity is
particularly hard to maintain since the helping relationship requires
11. For a classic description of the characteristics of a bureaucracy, see M. WrMlnu,
Bureaucracy, in FRoM MAX WBER 196, 196-98 (1946).
12. In Hartford, because of the large number of youthful offenders on parole, two
officers work only with young offenders while two others handle older parolees.
13. Wilensky, The Professionalization of Everyone?, 70 A. J. Soc. 137, 138-40 (1964).
702
Vol. 79: 698, 1970
Observations on the Administration of Parole
emotional involvement. Objectivity is preserved by the social worker's
experience with similar problems and awareness of the limitations
within which they must be met.14 As Wilensky and Lebeaux have
written:
[Gasework is a type of counselling process which emphasizes help-
ing an individual to identify, clarify, and understand his own
difficulties to the point where he can free himself from them, or
accept help.
. ..Casework operates on the premise that any individual fac-
ing social stresses which he cannot deal with has strengths and
inner resources which, if freed from the shackles of fear, inhibi-
tion, and other types of psychological blockage, will enable him
to become effectively self-responsible. . . .Casework's motto is
"help people to help themselves."... Exhortation and coercion are
avoided.' 5
The parole officer's claim to professionalism is that he does casework,
and his professional norms are those of the social worker, not the
policeman. Though there are few standard requirements for becoming
a parole officer, many have had social work training,6 and all feel and
exhibit a trained sensitivity to the problems of parolees.
Bureaucratic pressures constrain the parole officer's sense of profes-
sionalism.17 Officers feel that red tape is an insult to their professional
status. Some officers object to the forms they are required to fill out;
instead of submitting a simple list of supervisory contacts at year's end,
they would prefer to make short substantive summaries of the year's
events. Professional status is further undermined by the control exer-
cised by non-professionals in the Department and on the Parole Board.
Under the Connecticut parole system, however, whatever frictions
are generated by placing professionals in a bureaucracy are muted. The
upper echelons do not closely regulate the field officer. The area super-
14. H. wILEr-NSKY & C. LIEFUX, INDUSTRUL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL WELFARE 2&-85, 287-91
(1958). For a general discussion of the professional aspects of social work, se Toren.
Semi-Professionalism and Social work, in THE SE I-PRoFESsIo Ns AND THrM Or.GAUN.imo.
141 (A. Etzioni ed. 1969).
15. Wlensky & Lebeaux, supra note 14, at 290.
16. The Department requires a college degree and one year of field experience for a
beginning officer. Seventy per cent of the officers in Connecticut had advance training
and field experience in social work, while the remainder had police experience. Compare
Gross, Biographical Characteristics of Juvenile Probation Officers, 12 Csu.NIE & Dr.. 109,
111 (1966) (67% of sample had bachelor's degrees; 23% had master's degrees).
17. A. BLUMBEEG. CRIMINAL JUsTicE 156 (1967: "The greatest source of dissonance in
probation officers' wvork lives is the tenuous and unrealistic nature of their mrted
professionalism." Blumberg's polemic may be true of probation officers, but it is not
true of parole officers, whose claims to professionalism have a solid foundation in their
work.
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visors view their jobs in professional, not bureaucratic terms. The
parole officer sees himself only loosely bound by rules which purport
to regulate his work; for example, the officer does not feel obliged to
report every violation of parole conditions. Even when routinized
modes of behavior are adopted, as when the initial interview takes a
standard shape or when routine procedures are used to get the parolee
a job, they are dictated more by the pressures of time than by rules
from above.
Other structural features on the job reinforce an officer in his at-
tempt to do casework. The Department of Corrections encourages
officers to take courses in sociology and social work by subsidizing their
tuition. Supervisors encourage casework and support officers faced with
difficult decisions. Nearly every decision to recommend revocation of
parole is discussed extensively, if often informally, with the super-
visor.' 8 The office is run informally; each officer has nearly complete
discretion to order his time as he wishes. Perhaps most important, the
officer's work cannot be tightly regulated. Most of his work involves
private interactions with and on behalf of the parolee. The quality of
the service he provides cannot be evaluated by simple statistics, but
must be judged by less concrete standards.1 9 As a result, the parole
office resembles not a company's accounting department but a partner-
ship of professionals, each autonomous in his realm.
IV. The Threat of Role Conflict
The parole officer's authority to invoke sanctions creates conflicts
not only with the parolee but also within himself, by forcing him to
choose between the goals of rehabilitation and control. Instead of
attempting to reconcile these incompatibles, the parole officer un-
equivocally pursues the former, choosing to be a social worker rather
than an adjunct of the police.
Parole officers must go to police headquarters frequently, since
parolees are constantly being picked up.20 Here and at the prison the
parole officer talks with men of a different orientation who also have
18. Cf. Hendrick, supra note 5, at S. See also Carrera, Some Thoughts on the Proba.
tLion Supervisor's Job, 32 FED. PRoB. 28 (Sept. 1968).
19. Compare P. BLAU, THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAuI1mAcY 34-40, 102 (1955) (contrasting
measurement of productivity through statistics and through professional Judgment).
20. Indeed, some parole "offices," particularly those in rural areas used only once a
month for interviews, are located in police stations.
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daily contacts with parolees, prisoners, and criminals. And like police-
men, urban parole officers develop extensive contacts in the criminal
subculture. They take part in the informal criminal communication
system to learn what is happening, who is doing it, and why. Informa-
tion is given by these contacts with the joint understanding that it is
not to be used punitively but rather for insight into the parolee's life,
to keep him away from activities that will lead to a return to prison.
Observation revealed a striking absence of police ideology among
parole officers. For example, revocation was recommended only after
a series of events which indicated to the officer that the parolee would
not benefit from continued parole. This lack of a punitive orientation
is particularly remarkable given the attention paid to the conflict be-
tween custodial and treatment goals in the sociology of corrections."x
Whereas prior studies have concentrated on conflicts between different
types of workers,22 in parole both goals are part of the officer's orienta-
tion. His rejection of one of these goals must be explained.
In sociological terms, the problem is one of role conflict. Role is
defined as "a set of expectations,... a set of evaluative standards ap-
plied to an incumbent of a particular position."23 Here the incumbent,
the parole officer, faces expectations from several "counter-positions2 4
-the Department of Corrections, parolees, the police, and the public.
Most of these "counter-positions" generate expectations consonant with
professional norms. The Department of Corrections shares and rein-
forces the parole officer's rehabilitative orientation. Promotion of
officers with field experience to supervisor, for example, comports with
social work ideology, in which supervisors should be sensitive to the
problems faced by men in the field. The social agencies and employers
whom the officer contacts also view the parole officer as a social worker.
Others, however, expect parole officers to be like policemen. Parolees
often cast their officers in this role. But since the parole officer sees
these expectations as based on a misconception of his purpose, the ex-
21. See, e.g., Weber, Conflicts Between Professional and Non-Professional Personnel in
Institutional Delinquency Treatment, 48 J. CRIM. LC. & P.S. 26 (1957); Hall, Williams &
Tomano, The Challenge of Correctional Change, 57 J. Cpmr. L. & P.S. 493, 494 (19m13);
Grusky, Role Conflict in Organization, 3 AD. Set. Q. 452, 453 (1959); Cressey, Contradictory
Directives in Complex Organizations, 4 AD. Set. Q. 1 (1959).
22. But see Grusky, supra note 21, at 456-59.
23. N. GRoss, W. MASON & A. UCEAcERN, EXPLORATIONS IN ROLE ANALYSIS 60 (1958).
This work is a brilliant model of definition and analysis; unhappily, it is more cited
than imitated. For a lucid and incisive critique, see P. DArENDoRF, Homo Sociologicus,
in ESSAYS IN Tkm THEoRy oF SocmEY 44 (1968).
g4. N. Gross et al., supra note 23, at 62.
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pectations cannot define how he ought to behave; they are simply
obstacles to be overcome. The police themselves, however, view the
parole officer as an ally. Parole revocation is used as an alternative to
prosecution for serious offenses, and is seen as an easier method for
reincarceration of the offender.25 However, the police have few sanc-
tions with which to enforce their expectations by shaping officers'
conduct. A parole officer who did not recommend revocation in some
cases where the evidence "warranted" it might lose some police sources
of information, but his work would suffer minimally because he has
many other sources. Finally, the "public" expects parole officers to be
law enforcers. But this expectation is mediated through the officer's
friends, who are likely to be more sympathetic to his non-punitive ap-
proach than the general public. Thus, conflicting expectations do
exist, but the parole officer interacts far more with professionals who
accept his own orientation than with people who expect him to per-
form police functions. The norm of service is reinforced while that of
punishment lacks support.26
The self-selection of parole officers also diminishes role conflict. No
formal tests measure the officer's professional orientation, but the first
months on the job serve to screen out overly punitive officers. More
important, as one officer said, "You have to be an optimist to take this
job." In part, optimism is ensured by the requirement that parole
officers have social welfare or law enforcement experience. Men who
choose to leave law enforcement positions may have had their optimism
stifled in the police agency. Perhaps too their experience has shown
them how human it is to become a criminal. On the other hand, while
social workers are assumed to be "optimists," their move to parole may
indicate a more punitive orientation. For example, most officers felt
the practice of carrying weapons unnecessary and demeaning to their
professional status; the officers who wanted weapons had all been
welfare workers.
Role conflict, then, seems to have only a small impact on the officer.
The system hires and promotes men whose values are those of the social
worker, and once they assume the role, officers are in contact largely
with groups which reinforce those values.
25. See R. Dawson, supra note 3, at 340.41, 358, 363.
26. This argument is consistent with the empirical findings of N. Gross el al,, supra
note 23. Interaction increases role consensus, id. at 177: homogeneous preparatloti does
the same, id. at 146; membership in a profession limits consensus with non-professionals,
id. at 180-81; and the legitimacy of expectations is a key dimension in resolving role
conflicts, id. at 285-86.
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V. Authority and Social Casework
The casework process in parole is distorted at nearly every point by
the fact that the parole officer is authorized by the state, not by the
parolee, to invoke penal sanctions against the parolee. Parole officers
must accommodate themselves to a situation in which they have power
to which social work ideology denies legitimacy, that is, where the
client's participation in the relationship is compelled rather than
voluntary.
Casework theorists have not dealt with the problems of authority
faced by parole officers. Instead of modifying casework theory to take
account of authority, theorists blur the meaning of authority to bring
it into accord with casework theory. Some, indeed, dismiss the problem
by exhorting the parole officer to be a superior social worker so that
the wall of authority can be broken down.27 But the most common
response is to assert that authority can be a positive tool in rehabilita-
tive work. Authority is said to be a universal factor with which the
parolee must learn to live;28 the officer's authority is a pole of stability
which helps the parolee orient himself. 0 While these general propo-
sitions may be true,3 0 they miss the point by failing to distinguish
among types of authority. A loving, parental authority, the model on
which these theorists rely, is fundamentally different from a police-
man's legal authority.
In psychological terms the availability of sanctions transforms the
parole officer from one who suports the client's ego to one who sits as
super-ego on the parolee's shoulder. There is no assurance that this
super-ego control will be internalized, for unlike the family model,
there is no reason to expect that the authority will be seen as loving.
In a family model of the officer-client relationship where the officer
takes the parent's role, the relationship becomes strained. The officer
27. See, e.g., id. at 247, 273-74; Weiss, The Social Worker's Technique and Probation,
in PROBATION AND CRIMINAL JusTicE 165, 184-86 (S. Glueck ed. 1933); Meeker, Probation
is Casework, 12 FE. PROB. 51 (June 1948); Studt, An Outline for the Study of Social Au-
thority Factors in Casework, in SOCIAL CSEWORK IN TuE FirTrS 272, 275 (C. Kasius ed.
1962).
28. See, e.g., Tracey, A Social Worker's Perspective on Social Work in Probation. 7
CRnaE & DEL 131, 184 (1961); Hardman, Authorzty in Casework, 5 N.P.P.A.J. 249 (1959);
D. DR.ssLER, PRACTICE AN THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 139 (1959).
29. See, e.g., Hardman, The Constructive Use of Authority, 6 Ciun.E & DEL. 245, 250
(1960); Kawin, Therapeutic Use of Authority, 17 FED. PROD. 22, 24 (Sept. 1953); Sheriff,
Authority in the Client-Worker Relationship, 17 FED. PROD. 22, 24-25 (June 1953); Silver-
man, Surveillance, Treatment, and Casework Supervision, 2 N.P.P.A.J. 22, 28 (1956).
30. For contrasting views, compare Studt, Casework in the Correctional Field, 18 FEm.
PROB. 19 (Sept. 1954), with Blake, Probation Is Not Casework, 12 FED. PROD. 54 (June
1948). For an argument that the discussion is misdirected, see Kelling, Caught in a Cross-
Fire of Concepts, 14 Cutam & DF.L. 26 (1968).
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resents the lack of reciprocity, though he understands its origin and
indeed believes it to be reasonable. The parolee resents the officer's
forced intrusion into the parolee's "family," and the relationship, de-
spite the officer's efforts to help the parolee adjust to a hostile world,
rarely transcends the parolee's initial suspicion. That it does so on
occasion indicates how well some officers do their job. But they too find
it anomalous to assume a parental role in relation to a grown man,
which may account for some officers' discouragement with their work
with older offenders.
In addition, the officers really do not want to force their services on
anyone. They do not search out problems, and they hesitate to probe
deeply into the parolee's life through use of the conditions of parole.
Their concern for the legitimacy of intervention stems from the con-
sensual norms of social work. The lack of consent and the availability
of sanctions put the officer who wishes to do social work under strain
from the conflict between his ideals and his position.
That strain is only slightly relieved by other structural elemei'ts;
success in overcoming the conflict depends far more on the officer's
talent. Recruitment and promotion practices, by reinforcing social
work norms, only exacerbate the problem, which lies precisely in the
officer's adherence to social work norms in a setting where they cannot
be fully realized. The legal requirement that parole can be revoked
only for some violation of a specific condition 81 suggests that the
system places great value on the maximization of freedom32 It also
serves the rehabilitative goal by limiting the officer's discretion, thereby
making it easier for the parolee to trust the officer, and by letting the
officer believe that the parolee's objective behavior and not the officer's
professional judgment is responsible. when parole is revoked.83 But this
is a pallid technique of evasion; the problem can be removed only by
giving the authority to initiate revocation to other officials. 4
Parole officers have developed other ways of reducing tension. Social
work theory provides a definition of successful casework: the establish-
ment of a helping relationship.3 Instead of adopting this definition,
however, officers use a more result-oriented approach, in which they
31. R. Dawson, supra note 3, at 340-41.
32. Note, Freedom and Rehabilitation in Parole Revocation Hearings, 72 YAix L.J.
368, 378 (1962).
33. Cf. A. GOULDNER, PATtERNS OF INDUSTRIAL BUREAUCRACY 164-66 (1954) (screening
function of rules).
34. For a similar argument, see R. FMERSON, JUDGING DELINQUENTS 230-35 (1969).
S5. See, e.g., G. HMITON, THEORY AND PRACrIcE OF SOCIAL CASEWORK V, 6, 29, and
passim.
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concentrate on the ultimate fate of the parolee. Success is defined as
(1) seeing a parolee through to his discharge from parole, or (2) keeping
him out of prison longer than he would have stayed out without the
officer's supervision. Because of the Parole Board's new release policy,
under which nearly three-quarters of the applicants receive parole on
the date they are first eligible,3 some officers believe that the Board no
longer screens applicants with an eye to their likely success on parole.
This practice relieves some tensions when the goal of discharge is
adopted. Most of an officer's time is spent with parolees whose success-
ful discharge is unlikely, but the officer can blame the Board for failing
to screen out prisoners whose early release was ill-advised.
Though it is sometimes difficult to tell how long an unsupervised
parolee would have remained out of prison, the second definition of
success helps reinforce the officer's professionalism. His sense of success
is determined in part by comparing the experience of other officers
with offenders of a similar type. Officers discuss past parolees con-
stantly, and each new case reminds them of old ones. These discussions
and exchanges of information among officers are valuable not only in
reinforcing a sense of professionalism, but also in allowing officers to
review and reflect upon their own experiences in the company of a
sympathetic audience.
Though a definition of success in terms of keeping a parolee out of
prison creates its own problems, it provides officers with a way of
evaluating their own performance without reference to the impractic-
able social work standard. It serves therefore to divert the officers from
some of the tensions created by the contrast between the reality of the
job and the ideals to which they adhere.
VI. Conclusion
So long as authority to invoke serious sanctions lies in the hands of
parole officers, demands to circumscribe that authority will inevitably
arise. Most commonly, the demand is for procedural protections for
the parolee.Y7 This approach fails, however, to deal with parole as it is
26. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1970, at 47, col. 2. In practice, all states must release almost
all prisoners before the expiration of their terms, simply to make room for new imnates.
The TAsK FORCE REPoRT, supra note 10, at 194, states that the average daily parole cost
per case is 88 cents, while the average daily prison cost per prisoner is $5.2-. Compare
Comment, Due Process and .Revocatton of Conditional Liberty, 12 WAYNr 1. FIm. 638,
640 (1966): "The primary consideration underlying parole is probably cconomics.'
57. See, e.g., Kadish, The Advocate and the Expcrt: Counsel in the Peno.Correctional
Process, 45 MINN. L. REv. 803 (1961); F. CoHFN, LEGAL NOWmS IN COrInCtIONS (1967); A.
Blumberg, supra note 17; Note, Parole, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 702 (1963); Note, Freedom and
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actually administered. Such arguments address a conception of the
parole process in which officials exercise an uncontrolled discretion,
whereas the actual use of authority by parole officers is directed to and
limited by the professional ideal of rehabilitation. Imposing procedural
protections cannot help officers achieve this goal.
An outline of a more drastic revision of the parole system can high-
light the relationships between authority, rehabilitation, and control.
The changes proposed here are not intended as recommendations, but
rather as suggestions about the paths which less comprehensive changes
might take if parole is to become an effective means of rehabilitation.
If parole officers were deprived of their authority to invoke sanctions,
most of the structural obstacles to rehabilitation would disappear. The
officers could then pursue more effectively the rehabilitation work they
wish to do. Parole revocation could become more judicial, for those
who would revoke parole-the Parole Board-would function as de-
cisionmakers in an adversary process. Parole officers would represent
the state's interest in rehabilitation and the prosecutor and police its
interest in deterrence, while the parolee and his lawyer would advocate
the parolee's interest.
The alternative system could be instituted without eliminating the
functions of parole. Because the parole system would no longer provide
penal sanctions, the parole office would become a specialized social
agency devoted to the needs of just-released prisoners. It would, of
course, provide some rewards, such as job placement and easier access
to other agencies, for those parolees who chose to use it. But no parolee
would be compelled to report to the parole office; if he came, he would
come because he believed the office was designed to help him.38 Exten-
sive preparation before release would inform prisoners of the help
the parole office could give them, but the ultimate decision to use the
office would be the parolee's. The parolee's voluntary approach would,
in turn, establish the basis for guidance legitimized by the parolee's
consent.
In such a system, the police and not the parole officer would invoke
the process of summary revocation. If a parolee had used the parole
office, it would be informed, and the parole officer would consult with
Rehabilitation in Parole Revocation Hearings, 72 YAL L.J. 368 (1962); Note, 1969 Dtui
L.. 139; Comment, Due Process and Conditional Liberty, 12 WAYNE L. REV. 638 (1966);
Comment, 28 S. CAL. L. RZV. 158 (1955); Note, Parole Revocation Procedures, 65 HAlkv.
L. REv. 309 (1951); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 249-52 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting).
38. Cf. Ohlin, Piven & Pappenfort, Major Dilemmas of the Social Worker it Probation
and Parole, 2 N.P.P.A.J. 211, 215-16 (1956).
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the police and the parolee. At this point, complex issues of confiden-
tiality arise. An absolute privilege for officer-client communications
may be necessary to preserve open communication. Even with such a
privilege, however, the parole officer may feel a strain between his
professional duty to his client and his citizen's duty to the police, as
when a parolee tells the officer of a crime the parolee has committed.
But such strains inhere in all professions and are resolved by the canons
of professional ethics.
Without the risk that the parole officer will invoke penal sanctions,
his professional judgment can be trusted during the period of super-
vision. Vesting the actual responsibility for revoking parole in the
Parole Board would bring the revocation process closer to the due
process model and, though limiting the parole officer's responsibility,
would not diminish his sense of professionalism. The American legal
system assumes that lawyers are better able to balance competing con-
siderations of public policy than are other professionals. By assigning
single functions to institutions like parole, the legal system would en-
sure that the balancing be done openly by officials expected to have
special abilities.
Any analysis of the operation of parole and of proposals for change
must recognize the dual nature of parole. It is a mechanism of control,
but it is also an attempt, sincerely and ably implemented, to guide con-
victed offenders into socially accepted ways of living. Criticism of the
parole system, by focusing only on the first purpose, generates under-
standable resentment from parole officers. Neither an increase in the
officers' authority nor a circumscription of that authority by procedural
protections can advance the goal of rehabilitation. Criticism of parole
is best directed toward those aspects of the system which inhibit re-
habilitation. The guidance function of parole officers may best be
strengthened by eliminating entirely their authority to invoke sanc-
tions.
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